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Killing Time, Not Germans
Reserve Positions in the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division during the Battle of Normandy 
A L E X  S O U C H E N
Abstract : Allied victory during the Battle of Normandy is often 
attributed to operational and strategic factors, but the high-level focus 
on command and combat effectiveness obscures the infantry’s lived 
experiences. Although combat was their primary purpose, soldiers 
killed time as often as they killed Germans. This article examines the 
significance of the reserve position and the “down time” that soldiers 
spent within its confines. It argues that the reserve position was critical 
to combat effectiveness and high morale because it provided defensive 
and offensive flexibility and surplus labour for work parties and logistical 
tasks, while officers used it to integrate reinforcements and manage 
the strain of battle through frequent rotations to the rear. For the 
troops, being stationed in reserve opened up a variety of experiences 
and activities that defined daily life, but as the Allied armies moved 
inland the meaning and significance of “rest” changed when the space 
for more elaborate rear area services was secured. Yet these new 
amenities were also accompanied by some unintended consequences as 
they helped spread an epidemic of dysentery and food poisoning that 
ravaged Canadian soldiers in July and August 1944.
In scholarly and popular accounts of the Battle of Normandy, Allied victory is usually attributed to a mix of operational and 
strategic variables. First, the Allies gained aerial superiority over 
Western Europe and managed to surprise the enemy with a major 
amphibious assault on Normandy’s coastline. Next, they deployed 
an overwhelming superiority of manpower and materiel resources in 
sustained combat operations that simultaneously offered lessons for 
improving tactical effectiveness and eventually wore down the German 
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2 Killing Time, Not Germans
forces arrayed against them. The Allies also benefitted from several 
strategic miscalculations made by the German high command, such 
as the ill-advised counterattack on American forces near Mortain in 
early August 1944.1 However, despite the accuracy of these broader 
interpretations, the high-level focus on grand strategy, operational 
progress and combat effectiveness tends to obscure, rather than 
illuminate, the full breadth of the infantry’s lived experiences. 
Although combat was the infantry’s primary purpose, daily life on 
the front lines included a diverse range of other, non-combat related 
experiences and events that contributed to Allied success. Indeed, for 
those at the sharpest end, there was much more to the experience of 
war than just fighting the enemy. Canadian soldiers killed time as 
often as they killed Germans and while historians have written much 
about the fighting, there remains a great deal more to be said about 
the “quiet” times in between each battle. This oversight is likely a 
product of the lasting debates and controversies surrounding Allied 
combat effectiveness in Normandy, and the Canadian performance in 
particular, which prompted scholars to prioritise tactical, operational 
and strategic paradigms ahead of other approaches.2 Consequently, 
only a handful of studies have been written on the Canadian auxiliary 
services and entertainment units, soldiers’ culture and civil-military 
relations, which leaves large gaps in our collective knowledge about 
1  Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003); and Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British 
and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019).
2  Copp, Fields of Fire, 3-32. See also C. P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The 
Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 1960); and John A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy 
Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New York: Praeger, 1991).
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how Canadian soldiers occupied themselves away from combat in 
Normandy.3
Through the close examination of battalion war diaries, this 
article explores the wider significance of the reserve position and the 
“down time” soldiers spent within its confines in relationship to the 
infantry’s lived experiences and operational progress in Normandy. 
All units in the Canadian Army were required to maintain a log, or 
war dairy, of its activities for historical purposes. These diaries were 
usually maintained by members of the Intelligence or “I” Section, 
attached to battalion headquarters, who recorded all manner of 
events and actions in daily entries and often included photographs, 
orders, maps, newspapers and other materials that documented the 
unit’s social and cultural settings.4 Historians have long recognised 
the value of battalion war diaries for substantiating details about 
combat operations or understanding a unit’s circumstances and 
capabilities ahead of major engagements. But we must also be careful 
in interpreting these sources, precisely because they were maintained 
for historical purposes. Those responsible for the war diary were not 
interested in recording criticisms of high command or anything else 
that might tarnish their unit’s reputation, so the log entries tend to 
contain overly positive descriptions of unit operations and activities. 
Yet, despite these limitations, war diaries offer invaluable windows 
3  Alan Hurst, The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in World War II (Goodfellow Printing, 
n.d.); Clifford H. Bowering, Service: The Story of the Canadian Legion, 1925-1960 
(Ottawa: Dominion Command, 1960); Scott Young, Red Shield in Action: A Record 
of Canadian Salvation Army War Services in the Second Great War (Toronto: Clarke 
& Co., 1949); War Services of the Canadian Knights of Columbus, 1939-1947: A 
History of the Work of the Knights of Columbus Canadian Army Huts (Montreal: 
Knights of Columbus, 1948); Laurel Halladay, “‘It Made Them Forget About the 
War For a Minute’: Canadian Army, Navy and Air Force Entertainment Units 
During the Second World War,” Canadian Military History 11, 4 (2002): 21-35; 
Sean Longden, To the Victor the Spoils D-Day to VE-Day: The Reality Behind the 
Heroism (Gloucestershire: Arris Publishing, 2004); Tim Cook, Canadians Fighting 
the Second World War, Vol. 1 and 2 (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2014 and 2015); and Terry 
Copp and Michelle Fowler, “Heavy Bombers and Civil Affairs: First Canadian Army 
in France, July-September 1944,” Canadian Military History 22, 2 (2015): 5-18.
4  War Diary (WD) – Canadian Scottish Regiment (CSR), Lieutenant T. A. Burge, “A 
Note of Appreciation for Work WELL DONE,” n.d., RG24 Department of National 
Defence fonds, vol. 15038, file 734(400), Library and Archives Canada (LAC).
3
Souchen: Killing Time, Not Germans
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
4 Killing Time, Not Germans
into daily life on the front lines, particularly as they relate to the 
soldiers’ experiences away from combat.5
This article makes three interrelated arguments. First, that 
the reserve position was tactically and operationally significant to 
combat operations and the maintenance of high morale. All units 
within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division—whether at the brigade, 
battalion or company levels—established defences in depth, with the 
reserve position located behind the front lines but still close enough to 
support forward units in the event of an attack. This offered offensive 
and defensive flexibility that proved instrumental in overcoming the 
German counterattacks after D-Day. In addition to the tactical and 
operational advantages, unit commanders used the reserve position 
to maintain high morale by managing the physical and psychological 
strain of battle. Within the 3rd Division there was a constant rotation 
of units into reserve, as brigades, battalions and companies shifted 
sub-units in and out of combat so that troops could rest and reorganise 
before the next engagement. Moreover, these rotational tactics were 
also employed at the individual level as a pre-emptive measure to 
forestall nervous breakdowns and battle exhaustion casualties.
Second, this article argues that the human experience in war 
included a diverse range of events and activities that did not involve 
combat. Although the soldiers’ stay in reserve was often cut short 
and proved no vacation from the rigours of war, being stationed there 
opened up a variety of opportunities and outlets that traditional 
military history often ignores. If units were not organising work 
parties, patrols or training reinforcements, soldiers had an opportunity 
to catch up on sleep and letter writing, do laundry, clean their 
equipment and themselves, unwind with recreational activity or loot 
from surrounding villages. This introduced a whole realm of different 
social interactions and activities that defined important elements of 
the lived experience, improved comradeship, helped soldiers cope with 
trauma and ultimately improved morale and unit cohesion. 
Finally, this article argues that the experience of being in reserve 
evolved as the campaign in Normandy moved inland. During the 
bloody month after D-Day, the Allies possessed no safe rear area 
5  Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writing of the World 
Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); and Christine Leppard, “Documenting the 
D-Day Dodgers: Canadian Field Historians in the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945,” 
Canadian Military History 18, 3 (Summer 2009): 7-18.
4
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large enough to support luxuries like field kitchens or concert venues. 
These types of amenities simply did not exist for the beleaguered 
members of the 3rd Division, but the troops still exercised agency 
and found ways to occupy themselves between combat actions. 
However, after the capture of Caen, there was a distinct change in 
the type of rest offered to soldiers and the reserve position took 
on new significance. By late July, elaborate rear area services were 
available on the continent so soldiers could watch movies or relax far 
away from German shells. Although scholars have generally ignored 
these changes, they were noted by the troops, especially when their 
diets were altered by field kitchens and when the 3rd Division was 
rotated into reserve for an extended break in early August. Yet, 
these new amenities were accompanied by unintended suffering and 
consequences. Throughout the campaign in Normandy, health and 
environmental conditions steadily deteriorated and the resulting 
squalor, depravity and swarms of flies brought on a scourge of food 
poisoning and dysentery right as the Canadian Army fought to 
capture Falaise. 
reserve positions and rotational tactics 
On any given day in Normandy, Canadian units were heavily engaged 
with the enemy as the grisly casualty rate attests. Over roughly 
seventy-six days, total Canadian casualties from all formations 
amounted to 18,444, of which 5,021 were fatal.6 Moreover, as Terry 
Copp has shown, by the end of September 1944, the 3rd Division had 
suffered through thirty-one “Intense Combat Days,” incurring an 
average of 298 casualties per day, while the 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Division endured thirty days with an average of 273 casualties.7 
These statistics certainly speak to the horrific nature of the fighting, 
but we must also remember that the troops were not in action for 
every minute of that time. After all, the inverse of Copp’s statistics 
highlights how both infantry divisions spent forty-five and forty-six 
days, respectively, without “intense combat.” 
6  Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 271.
7  The criteria for the term “Intense Combat Days” was established by the Operational 
Research teams of the 21st Army Group. Terry Copp, “To the Last Canadian? 
Casualties in 21st Army Group,” Canadian Military History 18, 1 (2009): 3-6.
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Even periods of the worst fighting were interspersed with periodic 
breaks. For example, in his after-action report about the Canadian 
Scottish Regiment’s (Can Scots) counterattack on Putot-en-Bessin 
on 8-9 June 1944, Private R. H. Tutte felt it important enough to 
include a statement about his unit’s lunch break. During a “quiet 
spell” around noon they stopped to eat and he remarked that “it was 
certainly very decent of ‘Jerry’ to allow a pause for refreshments.”8 
The biting sarcasm aside, Tutte’s description offers insight into the 
wider scope of experiences on the front lines. Even at the height 
of combat operations, short breaks occurred whenever feasible. 
Far from being an insignificant part of combat operations, unit 
commanders at all levels recognised the value of rest and used their 
reserve positions accordingly. As this section shows, to maintain high 
morale and better manage the psychological and physical strain of 
combat, commanders rotated battalions, companies and individuals 
into reserve for short respites. The reserve position, therefore, not 
only provided greater defensive depth and tactical flexibility, it also 
allowed troops to regroup and reorganise before heading back out for 
the next encounter with the enemy. 
In the weeks after D-Day, the 3rd Division occupied territory 
north-west of the city of Caen. Its three brigades, each consisting 
of three infantry battalions, established fortress positions in their 
respective sectors by deploying two battalions forward and one in 
reserve. Before Caen was captured in early July, these brigade fortresses 
were formed around clusters of small villages that bisected major 
roads or railway embankments.9 The deployment of the 7th Brigade 
in early June serves to illustrate how this fortress tactic worked. In 
the early morning of 7 June, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles (RWR) and 
the Regina Rifles (The Johns) captured their intermediate D-Day 
objectives, the strategically vital towns of Putot and Bretteville 
L’Orgueilleuse, respectively. As Marc Milner has shown, both units 
were then subjected to furious German counterattacks and, while 
the Johns held their positions until relieved on the night of 18-19 
June, the RWR were overrun and nearly annihilated on 8 June. Only 
the evening counterattack by the Can Scots, 7th Brigade’s reserve 
battalion stationed in the rear at Secqueville-en-Bessin, restored the 
8  WD – CSR, Private R. H. Tutte, “The Advance, Occupation, and Holding of the 
Bridge at Putot-en-Bessin As I Saw It,” n.d., 3, RG24, vol. 15037, file 734(400), LAC.
9  Copp, Fields of Fire, 26-31, 61-76.  
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situation and they defended Putot until relieved and redeployed to 
Rots ten nights later.10 
Despite the heavy losses, the brigade’s deployment offered sufficient 
defensive depth and operational flexibility to hold the crucial positions 
bisecting the Caen-Bayeux highway. While the Canadian Scottish 
and Regina Rifles bore the brunt of continuous action throughout 
most of June, the Winnipegers were placed in reserve where they 
rebuilt their shattered infantry companies.11 Thus, the 7th Brigade 
example demonstrates that even at the height of major battles, some 
units were in reserve and not in direct confrontation with the enemy. 
To say that the 7th Brigade was in continuous combat from D-Day 
onwards makes perfect sense when utilising a broader operational-
strategic paradigm to interpret events, but when exploring the 
experience of war from the sharpest end, such generalisations about 
the continuity of combat operations are obscured and less definitive. 
This is also evident on a smaller scale, as similar arrangements 
were employed within each infantry battalion. Depending on the 
circumstances, a battalion’s Commanding Officer (CO) established a 
rotation amongst his four rifle companies by positioning one or two 
in reserve for a short period of time. Much like the brigade fortresses, 
this provided the battalion with a variety of advantages, such as 
greater defensive and offensive potential for patrols or counterattacks. 
Moreover, the rotation of companies into reserve ensured that 
relief was distributed somewhat evenly and if one was particularly 
decimated, it could receive a short break to absorb reinforcements or 
collect more supplies. In the heavy fighting at Bretteville, the Johns 
employed this rotation in at least one documented instance. On 15 
June, the war diarist noted that “A” company was repositioned to the 
same area as battalion headquarters and, although its members were 
shelled at various times throughout the day, withdrawing them a few 
hundred metres away from the front lines was a welcomed break.12 
Similarly, in the 9th Brigade’s sector on 8 June, “C” company of 
the Highland Light Infantry of Canada (HLI) was positioned in an 
10  WD – Regina Rifles (RR), log entry, 7-19 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, 
LAC; WD – Royal Winnipeg Rifles (RWR), log entry, 7-19 June 1944, RG24, vol. 
15233, file 934/1, LAC; WD – CSR, log entry, 7-19 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15037, file 
734(400), LAC; and Marc Milner, Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014).
11  WD – RWR, log entry, 11-14 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15233, file 934/1, LAC.
12  WD – RR, log entry, 15 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, LAC.
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open field and its soldiers spent the better part of the next thirty-six 
hours huddled in slit trenches under observation from the Germans 
who, in St. Contest and Galmanche, shelled anything that moved. 
Trapped in the hell of continuous shelling without an ability to fight 
back, nerves began to fray. As the war diarist noted on 9 June, “C 
[company] has been putting in an uncomfortable few days ... they 
are beginning to resemble the earth they live in and are feeling the 
strain.”13 When civilians reported that Buron was unoccupied, plans 
were made to send “C” company out to investigate, but Lieutenant-
Colonel (Lt.-Col.) F. M. Griffiths astutely decided it was best to 
postpone the patrol and instead moved “C” company to the rear on 
the afternoon of 10 June. The company took up a much preferable 
position in a small wooded area behind the church in Villons-les-
Buissons and received a twelve-hour break before heading out on a 
fighting patrol into Buron the next morning.14
These types of rotational tactics weaponised rest. The periodic 
breaks—interspersed between episodes of intense terror and killing—
brought some meagre relief to surviving soldiers, which maintained 
morale and forestalled battle exhaustion from spiralling out of 
control. These types of rotational tactics were largely derived from 
experiences in North Africa, Italy and the Pacific where the British 
and Commonwealth armies discovered that improved rear area 
services, welfare provisions and educational resources were essential 
to reducing neuropsychiatric casualties amongst citizen soldiers.15 
Therefore, all battalions in the 3rd Division developed various 
internal methods for addressing the persistence of “mental fatigue” 
but rotations into reserve remained the primary countermeasure. For 
example, new arrivals to infantry companies were often paired with 
experienced soldiers to steady nerves, offer advice, maintain discipline 
and better acclimatise them to life in slit trenches (especially at night). 
Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were also instructed 
to “watch very carefully” for signs of strain in the troops under their 
commands.16 If a particular individual was deemed to be at risk of 
a psychological breakdown, officers and NCOs acted pre-emptively 
13  WD – Highland Light Infantry (HLI), log entry, 9 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, 
file 754, LAC.
14  WD – HLI, log entry, 8-11 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC.
15  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 446-50, 530-39. 
16  “Battle Experience Questionnaire (BEQ), #205, Major J. G. Stothard,” RG24, 
vol. 10450, LAC.
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by removing the soldier from the proximate causes of his nervous 
state and sending him to the battalion’s Medical Officer (MO) for an 
initial diagnosis and treatment.17 This usually resulted in the patient 
receiving twenty-four to forty-eight hours of rest at “A” Echelon, the 
battalion’s rear area.
“A” Echelon was sometimes called “Happy Valley” by the troops 
and was usually located furthest from the front and under the 
command of the headquarters company commander. It was here where 
all the LOB (Left Out of Battle) personnel were stationed before an 
attack, along with all the vehicles not in use and any reinforcements 
that required more training before joining the rifle companies. In 
effect, it was the crossroads of battalion personnel—everyone who 
was departing from or arriving to the battalion passed through this 
administrative hub.18 At “A” Echelon, soldiers exhibiting signs of 
exhaustion were given a chance to sleep, get clean and eat a hot meal. 
As Major (Maj.) Clifford Chadderton explained, exhaustion cases in 
the RWR were housed in “the tent” where the patient received rest 
and was encouraged to discuss his traumatic experiences with others. 
In many instances this system was “enough to restore the courage 
to go back and take part in a dangerous and deadly existence” and 
according to him the process was always done without official records 
so the troops did not have to worry about any adverse consequences 
or accusations of cowardice.19
If the stay at “A” Echelon was not enough to treat the soldier, 
he was transferred to the 22nd Field Ambulance where Dr. Robert 
Gregory, the 3rd Division’s psychiatrist, managed a separate 
casualty system for severe cases of battle exhaustion.20 On the whole, 
centralising only the worst cases functioned fairly well, as Gregory 
reported only 213 exhaustion cases within the 3rd Division during 
the first fifteen days after D-Day, of which 124 recovered. By the 
17  “Psychiatric Problems Amongst Canadian Troops in Normandy,” 1 August 1944, 
RG24, vol. 12631, file 11/Psychiatry/5, LAC.
18  William Barnard, The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, 1860-1960: One Hundred 
Years of Canada (Don Mills: Ontario Publishing Company, 1960), 201.
19  Clifford Chadderton, Excuse Us! Herr Schicklgruber: A Memoir of an Officer 
who Commanded an Infantry Company of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in Normandy 
(Ottawa: War Amputations of Canada, 2004), 85-88, quote 86.
20  Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in 
the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1990), 110-20; and WD – 22nd Field Ambulance, log entry, 10 June 1944, 
RG24, vol. 15892, file 766, LAC.
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end of June, his system boasted a 64 per cent return rate for severe 
cases and the success carried on into July, when the 1st Canadian 
Exhaustion Unit reported 103 cases from the 3rd Division, far fewer 
than the 391 recorded from the 2nd Canadian Division.21 Yet, these 
numbers represented only a partial reflection of reality since Gregory 
never saw the mild cases that were treated by battalion MOs at “A” 
Echelons. 
The use of “A” Echelon appears to have worked quite well in 
combatting exhaustion cases. By the end of June, there were plans to 
expand capacity by adding a rest area at Corps headquarters, where 
greater resources and services could be concentrated. According to 
the war diarist for the HLI, by 30 June, this new rest area was able 
to accommodate one soldier per battalion for four days. As the diarist 
concluded, “it is thought that any man who is beginning to feel the 
strain may be saved from becoming a battle exhaustion case if sent 
back for a few days rest. Here he can get baths, wash his clothes, 
see shows and partake of other organized recreation. It is expected 
that this will be expanded to take in more men as time goes on.”22 
Thus, even though a safe and quiet rear area did not exist until after 
the capture of Caen, every battalion CO in the 3rd Division adopted 
rotational tactics to better manage the physical and psychological 
strain amongst his subunits.
working while resting
Although reserve positions were located further to the rear and 
somewhat removed from the immediacy of combat, being stationed 
there did not entail a holiday. In fact, the term “rest” was a partial 
misnomer, given its abject qualities and the laborious demands 
placed on those resting in reserve. In order to be tactically and 
operationally effective, especially at the battalion and company 
levels, units stationed in reserve could not be located more than a 
few hundred metres from the front. Therefore, these positions were 
21  WD – Assistant Director of Medical Services, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
(ADMS), log entry, 26 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15661, file 700, LAC; and “Quarterly 
Report – 1st Canadian Exhaustion Unit,” Appendix II, October 1944, RG24, vol. 
12631, file 11/Psychiatry/5, LAC.
22  WD – HLI, log entry, 30 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC.
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hardly ever out of the range of German mortar or artillery fire, 
which greatly affected the overall quality of rest that troops received. 
Moreover, in June and early July, the beachhead was too narrow 
to be safe from any German shelling, so even if a soldier was sent 
to “A” Echelon or the 22nd Field Ambulance, the sights, smells 
and sounds of war were still present and the sporadic shellfire was 
just as harmful to one’s life expectancy. Trapped in the paradox of 
frontline existence, the infantry never really got a chance to escape 
the hellish nightmare surrounding them. As the war diarist for the 
Queen’s Own Rifles (QOR) wrote after his unit was withdrawn for 
rest after the Battle of Carpiquet in early July: “[Troops] are finally 
established in their rest area. Galmanche. The lads are not pleased 
with the spot at all for the [buildings] are completely wrecked – there 
are dead animals and Germans all over the place and it is certainly 
not a spot to put the mind at rest. However the best is made of a 
bad go and the men bed down.”23
In addition to combat duties, reserve units were also tasked with 
other responsibilities that were nearly as demanding and difficult as 
fighting the enemy. During lulls in battle, battalion areas remained 
a beehive of activity as reserve forces were often utilised as surplus 
labour. In many cases, they were ordered to fortify defences or improve 
rear area infrastructure, meaning that soldiers in reserve could dig 
twice as much as those guarding the front line. For example, in 
the weeks after D-Day the North Shore Regiment occupied Rosel 
in a comparatively quiet sector of the front. During that time, work 
parties were continuously organised and sent out under the cover 
of darkness. On the night of 15-16 June, “A” company provided a 
covering and carrying party to prepare a minefield between Rosel 
and Vieux Cairon. The work would have continued on 17 June, but 
the wire and picket assignment was cancelled and the unit moved to 
Le Mesnil Patry the following day, where the hard work was restarted 
from scratch.24 For soldiers already weary from combat, the extra 
physical exertion was an unwelcomed burden, so being assigned to 
work parties could spark resentment and frustration. At Les Buissons 
on the night of 27-28 June, “A” and “B” companies of the North 
23  WD – Queen’s Own Rifles (QOR), log entry, 12 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15169, file 
753, LAC.
24  WD – North Shore Regiment (NSR), log entry, 15 and 17 June 1944, RG24, vol. 
15127, file 742, LAC.
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Nova Scotia Highlanders were ordered to dig the 9th Brigade’s new 
command post. During the night, the Brigade Major instructed them 
to dig the hole “big enough to drive a jeep into.” His orders drew the 
ire of “B” company’s second-in-command, who reportedly told the 
officer that his men were not members of the “Todt Organization”—a 
reference to the Germans’ use of slave labour.25 
Aside from digging, work parties were formed for other purposes, 
such as transporting ammunition, equipment and rations within 
units. Every battalion established a storage area near brigade 
headquarters, called “B” Echelon, where the unit’s quartermaster 
25  WD – North Nova Scotia Highlanders (NNSH), log entry, 27 June 1944, RG24, 
vol. 15122, file 734, LAC. 
Figure 1. A rare photograph of a carrying party. Note the boxes of compo rations and the jugs 
of water. [Library and Archives Canada, Regina Rifles War Diary, July 1944]
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received shipments from the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps 
and scheduled the distribution of supplies to infantry companies every 
seventy-two hours. This usually involved packing trucks to the brim, 
moving them forward (sometimes under heavy fire) and unloading 
all manner of supplies and weaponry near battalion headquarters. 
At that point, carrying parties were formed within companies and 
the materiel was dispersed to platoons throughout the battalion (see 
Figure 1).26 However, when forward companies were unable to spare 
the manpower, reserve forces were called upon for double-duty, hauling 
rations, water, kit, ammunition and all manner of other supplies into 
frontline positions and then their own. 
This lifeline of materiel was essential to all offensive and 
defensive operations, but equally important was the supply of 
capable reinforcements. In the weeks after D-Day, casualties in the 
3rd Division skyrocketed at rates alarmingly similar to those of the 
First World War. As always, infantry battalions suffered the highest 
losses when companies, platoons and sections were decimated by the 
grueling and bitter fighting: by 30 September the 3rd Division had 
sustained over 9,000 total casualties.27 According to Robert Engen’s 
recent study Strangers in Arms, casualties were so appallingly high 
that the social and demographic cohesion of the soldiers’ primary 
groups were rapidly torn apart in the farm fields north and south 
of Caen.28 This situation challenges many assumptions and theories 
about morale, or the willingness of individuals and groups to fight and 
persevere in combat. If morale depended, as many theories postulate, 
on the peer pressure of comradeship and group loyalty, then it should 
have broken down completely in the heavy fighting, when the influx 
of so many strangers replaced old friends or when shattered subunits 
were amalgamated to form new groups with few shared experiences.29 
However, censorship summaries and morale reports from British and 
Commonwealth forces in Normandy in June and July consistently 
26  “Feeding an Army,” n.d., RG24, vol. 12750, file 24/Episodes/7, LAC; Barnard, 
The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, 201; and Arnold Warren, Wait for the Wagon: 
The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1961), 280-85.
27  Copp, “To the Last Canadian?” 6.
28  Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 
1943-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 151-52.
29  Engen, Strangers in Arms, 3-17.
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indicated that morale remained high—especially amongst Canadian 
units—so clearly other factors were at play.30 
Engen offers a compelling hypothesis for why Canadian units 
maintained high morale during the bloodletting, arguing that “swift 
trust” was a decisive factor. Swift trust, or the ability to quickly form 
trust and cohesion within new groups and without long-term, face-
to-face interactions, was crucial to Canadian combat effectiveness 
amidst the heavy casualties. To replace the losses in rifle companies, 
battalion COs were constantly shuffling manpower between units, 
cobbling together ad hoc groups of green replacements with surviving 
veterans rotated into reserve. Within this framework of swift 
trust, larger structural factors played important roles in building 
effectiveness and cohesion, such as common training, familiarity with 
doctrine and tactics and institutional affiliations and knowledge.31 In 
that sense, as Caroline D’Amours has shown, the Canadian Army’s 
reinforcement system performed quite well in Northwest Europe 
because it managed to equip replacements with the basic skills and 
knowledge to swiftly integrate into new units—if they survived long 
enough in battle.32
The reserve position offered the space and time to reconstitute 
new units and further cement the bonds of swift trust. With the 
infusion of so many new faces and inexperienced soldiers into 
decimated battalions, COs started using the reserve position for 
extra training and to better acclimatise new arrivals with unit drill. 
In the Regina Rifles, where casualty rates reached 44 per cent by 
22 June, Lt.-Col. F. M. Matheson was forced to create an “NCO 
School” at “A” Echelon, where new NCOs received lessons about 
their roles and responsibilities, as well as the battalion’s unique 
history, procedures and traditions.33 Around the same time, Lt.-Col. 
G. H. Christiansen, CO of the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
Highlanders (SDGs), decided that similar measures were needed in 
his battalion. On 16 and 18 June, he put his reserve position to good 
use by organising a supplemental training regimen based on combat 
30  There was a serious drop in morale in August. Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 
503-50.
31  Engen, Strangers in Arms, 15-17, 151-60.
32  Caroline D’Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: Canadian Infantry Reinforcements 
during the Second World War,” Canadian Army Journal 14, 2 (2012): 73-89.
33  WD – RR, battalion order, 28 June 1944, and log entry, 29 June 1944, RG24, vol. 
15198, file 744, LAC.
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experience in Normandy. In addition to rifle and Bren-gun practice, 
the training regimen also focused on patrolling and survival skills. 
Troops were forced to crawl 500 metres and taught to communicate 
silently, while engineers gave lessons on an assortment of German 
mines and boobytraps.34 These types of training programs helped to 
pool collective assets and quickly integrate veterans and newcomers, 
which helped to attenuate morale problems caused by the rapid 
turnover in personnel.  
Training was not the only method used for building swift trust 
and integrating reinforcements. The SDGs’ training program was also 
complemented by a unit celebration: in the midst of the furious fighting 
in June, Christiansen authorised a “half-holiday” to commemorate 
the day on which the unit was mobilised four years earlier (see Figure 
2). On 20 June, two twelve-hour shifts were organised during which 
only 50 per cent of the unit was on duty at one time. An officers’ 
and sergeants’ dinner was organised, alcohol rations were issued to 
the men for the first time in France and packages from the auxiliary 
services were distributed to the companies in the evening.35 This 
day of celebration allowed new and veteran soldiers to interact in 
a more relaxed setting,  which promoted greater integration and 
familiarity between personnel as veterans took the opportunity to 
recount past experiences and unit folklore. Thus, the celebration 
reinforced battalion traditions and inspired unit pride.36 These types 
of initiatives illustrate both the diversity of methods used to integrate 
reinforcements and also the critical role of reserve positions, as the 
whole celebration would not have been as special without the twelve-
hour break. Thus, the reserve position provided combat units with 
the opportunity to build more cohesive social relations and bond as 
cooperative entities before re-entering the chaos of battle.
34  WD – Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders (SDGs), log entry, 16 and 18 
June 1944, RG24, vol. 15270, file 752, LAC. 
35  WD – SDGs, “4th Anniversary 20 Jun 44,” and log entry, 19-20 June 1944, RG24, 
vol. 15270, file 752, LAC. 
36  Alex Souchen, “The Culture of Morale: Battalion Newspapers in the 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division, June-August 1944,” The Journal of Military History 77, 2 (2013): 
555-56.
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actions and distractions
Regardless of the additional duties required of reserve forces, 
when rotated to the rear soldiers could look forward to a variety 
of other, non-combat related activities. By far the most welcomed 
opportunities involved sleeping and cleaning. Practically every unit 
war diarist noted the prevalence of these activities when soldiers 
rotated into reserve. Perhaps the HLI war diarist summed up the 
situation best when his unit received some “down time” a week 
after D-Day:
Figure 2. NCOs toasting the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders’ four-year 
anniversary, Vieux Cairon, 20 June 1944. [Library and Archives Canada, Department of National 
Defence, Lieutenant (Lieut.) Ken Bell, PA-138272]
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This rest gave everyone a chance to get out in the bright warm sun, 
have a bath and catch up on a little sleep. The strain of the last week 
had been considerable and it was only when things slacked off that the 
men realized it. For the first time since landing they were able to take 
off their clothes, get a good wash and clean up and do some washing.37
Things were similar in other battalions that had engaged in heavy 
fighting. In the wake of the battles for Buron and Authie, the North 
Nova Scotia Highlanders were moved to Les Buissons on 10 June and 
the break allowed “everyone [to get] a bit of rest” after a few horrific 
days.38 Similarly, the Regina Rifles’ war diary noted the prevalence 
of sleep after the Battle of Bretteville. The battalion had been 
defending, arguably, the most critical sector of the Anglo-Canadian 
front for almost two weeks, so the vast majority of surviving veterans 
took the opportunity to “catch up on [their] sleep” in Bray.39 
The importance of sleep cannot be overstated. Sleep was a luxury 
that few could afford in battle and many soldiers went days without 
it. As Captain (Capt.) Ronald Shawcross, a company commander 
with the Johns explained, “[i]n daylight I used to visit each platoon 
every three hours and at night every hour ... It was not conducive 
to rest or regular meals but then I couldn’t easily be seen by the 
Germans at night and also I could help my company stay awake.”40 
In numerous letters to his wife, Capt. Harold MacDonald, a company 
commander with the North Shores, recounted his exhaustive duties. 
After describing one particularly eventful day in July, he simply 
hoped for a “chance to sleep” that night, but the fortunes of war 
allowed him only an hour’s nap at dawn.41 On the frontlines, there 
was little time for sleep and consequently whenever a chance for extra 
rest presented itself soldiers made the most of it, as Shawcross did 
when he was rotated to “A” Echelon for a few days in early July.42 
37  WD – HLI, log entry, 12 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC.
38  WD – NNSH, log entry, 10 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15122, file 734, LAC. 
39  WD – RR, log entry, 18 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, LAC. 
40  Ronald G. Shawcross, “What Was It Like??” A Rifleman Remembers: The Royal 
Regina Rifles Regiment “Swift and Bold”: Some Memoirs of World War II, 1939-
1945 (Victoria: n.p., 2004), 154.
41  Harold MacDonald and M. A. MacDonald, “In the Heat of Battle: Letters from 
the Normandy Campaign,” Canadian Military History 11, 2 (2002): 35-36. 
42  Shawcross, “What Was It Like,” 167.
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Extra time for sleep was accompanied by time for washing and 
cleaning. At the front, it was hard to keep one’s self and equipment 
clean when the only available shelter was a muddy slit-trench exposed 
to the elements. After wearing the same clothing for days on end, 
cleaning uniforms was a top priority. When moved to quiet areas for 
more than a few hours, soldiers made the most of the opportunity 
and availed themselves of the surrounding rivers, wells or tubs for 
washing. This practice was so common it became problematic because 
soldiers left their laundry out in the sun to dry without any regard 
for camouflage or concealment. This prompted the Regina Rifles CO 
to prohibit hanging clothing in places that were visible from the air.43 
Furthermore, kit inspections were also carried out during this time 
as officers took the opportunity to ensure that soldiers repaired any 
tears in their uniforms and cleaned their weapons and equipment. 
If any deficiencies were discovered, soldiers were paraded to the 
Quartermaster who issued replacements.44 
When finished cleaning their kit and clothing, soldiers took the 
opportunity to wash themselves. For some, a good shave and maybe 
a decent haircut were always welcomed, especially if one could secure 
hot water. Others improvised their own facilities, such as Riflemen E. 
Deblois and J. C. Sackfield of the QOR who bathed in a discarded 
tub in Bretteville—and even helped scrub the dirt from each other’s 
backs (see Figure 3). Officers went to similar lengths. On a quiet day 
in Les Buissons, the senior officers and NCOs from the North Nova’s 
“A” company took the time to enjoy a quick sponge bath behind the 
company carrier.45 In other cases, soldiers used the nearby rivers and 
streams, though they were careful to swim far away from designated 
“water points” so as to avoid contaminating local water supplies.46 
There were also official channels through which soldiers could get 
clean. Mobile laundry and bath units roamed the 3rd Division’s area 
throughout the Normandy campaign. Whenever these units arrived, 
battalion headquarters organised a rotation in which one company 
was paraded there at a time. These units, operated by the Royal 
43  WD – RR, battalion order, 23 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, LAC. 
44  WD – NS, log entry, 10 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15127, file 742, LAC; WD – HLI, 
log entry, 12 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC; and WD – RR, log entry, 
18 and 20 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, LAC. 
45  WD – NNSH, log entry, 16 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15122, file 734, LAC. 
46  WD – QOR, battalion order, 11 July 1944 RG24, vol. 15169, file 753, LAC; and 
WD – RWR, log entry, 10 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15233, file 934/1, LAC. 
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Canadian Ordnance Corps, provided soldiers with hot showers and 
deloused uniforms. However, most Canadian Mobile Laundry and 
Bath Units did not arrive on the continent until late July; only the 
7th Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit landed in June.47 This not only 
speaks to the deteriorating and dismal state of hygiene amongst the 
troops, but also suggests the importance of individual initiative in 
securing unofficial channels for washing.
47  WD – 7th Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit, log entries, various dates, June 1944, 
RG24, vol. 16120, file 494, LAC. 
Figure 3. Riflemen E. Deblois (in the tub) and J. C. Sackfield, Bretteville, 20 June 1944. [Library 
and Archives Canada, Department of National Defence, Lieut. Frank Dubervill, PA-190809]
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Another prominent activity undertaken in reserve was letter 
writing (see Figure 4). Whether on the offensive or consolidating a 
position, the responsibilities of officers and other ranks were many 
and the opportunity to write letters home was not always available. 
Some soldiers, like Capt. MacDonald, went to astounding lengths to 
find the time to write.48 But for every prolific writer, there were others 
who wrote home only when they had the free time. Although letter 
writing could occur at any moment, it probably happened most when 
soldiers were pulled into reserve. As the North Novas’ war diarist 
48  MacDonald and MacDonald, “In the Heat of Battle,” 29-43.
Figure 4. An unidentified infantryman of the 9th Canadian Brigade writing a letter, 
8-9 July 1944. [Library and Archives Canada, Department of National Defence, Lieut. Frank 
Dubervill, PA-132800]
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noted on 19 June, while his unit was still in the 9th Brigade’s reserve 
position at Les Buissons, “[t]he boys spend a lot of time writing home 
these days as there is not much else for them to do.”49 Far from being 
insignificant to combat operations, opportunities for letter writing 
were paramount to maintaining high morale. As Jonathan Fennell 
and Robert Engen have shown, letter writing and mail deliveries 
formed the bedrock of unit morale as the esprit de corps of all 
British and Commonwealth armies was intimately connected to social 
and political factors on the home front. Regular correspondence with 
loved ones and friends bolstered fighting spirits and kept soldiers 
abreast of issues back home. Similarly, the regular delivery of mail to 
forward units affirmed the soldier’s trust in higher authorities and the 
logistics sustaining their perilous existence.50 Indeed, any breakdown 
in communications between the war front and home front was a 
devastating blow to the military’s combat effectiveness.
After finishing all of their immediate chores and letter writing, 
soldiers were left to fill the remaining time on their own initiative. 
This was especially the case in June and early July when the Allies 
could not organise any large recreational activities beyond the range 
of German guns. Many soldiers played cards and gambled or took 
advantage of the increasing supply of reading materials and newspapers 
circulated by the auxiliary services.51 However, most often, the troops 
explored nearby villages that local inhabitants had abandoned. In 
doing so, they took whatever was left behind. As the HLI’s war 
diarist noted when his battalion entered the deserted village of Les 
Buissons on 12 June, “[t]he men spent hours feeding and watering 
[the animals]. Many chickens found their way into the stew pot in the 
next couple days. And of course the cows were milked. After three 
weeks of compo rations you can be sure the farmers’ potato patch and 
onion patch took a beating.”52 
Looting was a common occurrence throughout the Normandy 
campaign and the HLI war diarist frequently noted his battalion’s 
proficiency at it, often with humorous anecdotes such as one instance 
when two soldiers argued over a stolen cow:
49  WD – NNSH, log entry, 19 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15122, file 734, LAC. 
50  Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 3; and Engen, Strangers in Arms, 237-39.
51  John Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II (London: 
David & Charles Ltd., 1980), 299-301; and Fennell, Fighting the People’s War, 
530-39.
52  WD – HLI, log entry, 12 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC. 
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Two soldiers could be seen arguing furiously along these lines, “Where 
are you going with my cow” “That’s not your cow, it is my cow” “Like 
Hell it is I’ve been feeding it for two days.” And henchmen hoping for 
a taste of bovine nectar would substantiate the arguments of both.53
Soldiers looted far more than just food. Since field comforts and 
personal items were not always available, all manner of other things 
were scrounged by soldiers. They took mattresses (for sleeping), 
barn doors (for covering their slit trenches) and anything else that 
augmented or maintained a minimal standard of living. Charles 
Martin, a Company-Sergeant Major in the QOR, later explained 
in his memoirs that his unit liberated a cast iron cooking pot and 
whenever ration supplies were low, they gathered up “all the odds 
and ends we could find around the village” and tossed them into the 
“makeshift super-cooker” that could feed the entire company.54 
Within the context of the soldiers’ dismal living conditions and 
callous life expectancy, looting served an important and practical, 
purpose: it offset shortages and augmented what was provided through 
official supply channels. However, if left unchecked, the pursuit of 
treasure behind the lines could negatively impact unit discipline and 
morale and undermine civil-military relations. After all, what the 
HLI war diarist described in light-hearted terms were, in fact, stories 
of Canadian troops ruthlessly pilfering crops and livestock, while the 
search for souvenirs and valuable items meant that they ransacked 
homes—whether abandoned or not. On 24 June, Capt. C. R. R. 
Douthwaite, the CO of the 3rd Field Security Section, reported on 
the aggressive looting of Canadian soldiers and how the deliberate 
acts of vandalism and theft were aggravating the French people and 
tarnishing the moral integrity of the Allied cause.55 Therefore, unit 
officers were obliged to rein in the soldiers’ behaviour and enforce 
stronger disciplinary standards to regulate material possession so 
53   WD – HLI, log entry, 12 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC. 
54  Charles Martin, Battle Diary: From D-Day and Normandy to the Zuider Zee and 
VE (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994), 50.
55  WD – 3rd Field Security Section, Field Security Report No. 2, 24 June 1944, 3, 
RG24, vol. 16391, file 543, LAC. 
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that unit morale would not fluctuate too severely during periods of 
shortages or surpluses.56
Moreover, stronger disciplinary standards against looting were 
needed in Normandy because of the abundance of alcohol and 
calvados, a powerful spirit derived from apples (see Figure 5). Nearly 
every farmhouse had a cellar filled with it and while French civilians 
56  As the pamphlet Morale in Battle stated: “Morale cannot be good unless it 
contains a quality of hardness. Hardship and privation are the school of the good 
soldier; idleness and luxury are his enemies.”  Bernard Montgomery, Morale in Battle: 
Analysis (Ottawa: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1947), 23, 81/289, Directorate of 
History and Heritage (DHH).
Figure 5. Sergeant C. Orton of the HLI drinking pilfered cider, 20 June 1944. [Library 
and Archives Canada, Department of National Defence, Lieut. Ken Bell, PA-133113]
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were generous with drink upon liberation, Canadian soldiers proved 
adept at uncovering other stores civilians had carefully concealed. For 
young soldiers facing their own mortality, alcohol consumption was a 
welcomed release, but it posed a serious problem for unit morale and 
combat effectiveness. Throughout the Normandy campaign, COs in 
every battalion dealt with alcohol abuses. In one case, on 13 June, 
the CO of the HLI placed all farms out of bounds and “ordered all 
sheds and wine cellars locked to put temptation out of the way” 
and the war diarist concluded that “was one way of ensuring that 
all men would be at all times in a fit state for fighting.”57 Later in 
the month, other battalions issued new warnings and orders against 
alcohol consumption because of several poisonings and deaths.58
The tighter controls against looting, emerging towards the end 
of June, culminated in a widespread clampdown on discipline that 
was instituted in the wake of the “Great Gale” on 19-20 June. 
The sudden onset of a powerful storm hindered the off-loading of 
supplies along the Normandy coast and at the two artificial harbours 
(codenamed Mulberry) that the Allies had brought across the English 
Channel. Although the Mulberry at Arromanches remained in 
operation following the storm, the one at St. Laurent was irrevocably 
damaged and Allied logistical planning was thrown askew.59 With 
supply shortages expected to rise, there were fears that looting 
would increase so almost every battalion issued orders prohibiting 
it. Following Caen’s capture, the 3rd Division’s CO, General Rod 
Keller, circulated a standing order placing the destroyed city out of 
bounds to all personnel. After explaining that the city’s residents 
had “lived through hell during the past month,” he told Canadian 
troops they were to offer assistance and support, instead of stealing: 
“In conclusion it must be further emphasized there must be NO 
57  WD – HLI, log entry, 13 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15076, file 754, LAC. 
58  WD – RR, battalion order, 22 June 1944, 25 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15198, file 744, 
LAC; WD – NNSH, log entry, 10 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15122, file 734, LAC; WD 
– QOR, log entry, 18 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15168, file 753, LAC; and WD – RWR, 
battalion order, 23 June 1944, RG24, vol. 15233, file 934/1, LAC. 
59  J. R. Martin, “Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-West Europe, 
1944. Part I: The Assault and Subsequent Operations of 3 CDN Inf Div and 2 CDN 
Armd Bde, 6-30 June 44,” 3 December 1945, 89-90, CMHQ Report 147, DHH; and 
Guy Hartcup, Code Name Mulberry: The Planning, Building, & Operation of the 
Normandy Harbours (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006).
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LOOTING.”60 Whether they stole, slept or wrote letters home, 
Canadian soldiers killed the time between combat operations with a 
whole variety of actions and distractions that defined so much of their 
daily lives and perilous existence.
evolution and significance
After the capture of Caen in early July 1944, there was a distinct 
change in the types of activities and the quality of rest that soldiers 
received. From that point onwards, battalion and company reserve 
positions were not the only areas available for rest, as the space 
for more elaborate arrangements became possible when Allied 
armies moved further inland. Additionally, the 3rd Division and 
2nd Armoured Brigade were not the only Canadian formations in 
Normandy anymore, as the 2nd Division was activated in mid-July 
and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division shortly thereafter. The 
burden of fighting was now spread over more units and, after nearly 
sixty days in the line, the whole 3rd Division was given a much-needed 
break at the beginning of August. During this period, a variety of 
new activities and experiences became possible. Sports teams were 
organised for recreational distractions and friendly competition and 
soldiers in at least three battalions were given an opportunity to visit 
Juno Beach as tourists, where they swam and relaxed for the day 
or toured battlefields from earlier in the campaign.61 Such activities 
were simply impossible in June.
The experience of being in reserve evolved in other ways. By the 
end of July, more personnel from the auxiliary services had landed 
on the continent. This meant that they could reach a greater number 
of soldiers with a growing diversity of field comforts, since each 
supervisor had a truck packed with all manner of magazines, snacks, 
sporting equipment and other creature comforts.62 Further behind 
the lines, supervisors with the Salvation Army and the Canadian 
Legion were equipped with power generators and film projectors so 
60  WD – QOR, battalion order, 11 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15169, file 753, LAC. 
Emphasis in original.
61  WD – QOR, log entry, 15 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15169, file 753, LAC; WD – 
NNSH, log entry, 1 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15122, file 734, LAC; and WD – CSR, 
log entries, 1-7 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15038, file 734(400), LAC.
62  Young, Red Shield in Action, 108.
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they could host movie nights. On more than a few occasions troops 
packed into makeshift theatres to watch Ida Lupino star in the 
1943 film The Hard Way or the 1944 hit Standing Room Only 
starring Fred MacMurray and Paulette Goddard.63 The Knights 
of Columbus put on several comedic shows to entertain the troops 
before the specialised entertainment units arrived on the continent.64 
As a testament to the importance of the auxiliary services and their 
provision of extracurricular activities, Capt. Bryson Kearns of the 
HLI explained that they should have been allowed to frequent the 
front lines more often instead of remaining in the rear and that the 
system should have been specially adapted in cases where a single 
division was committed for long periods of time.65
Aside from entertainment, the expanded beachhead made room 
for other logistical arrangements that carried immense influence 
over the parameters of the soldiers’ experiences. The larger 
amount of space, coupled with the increasing resources deployed 
by II Canadian Corps in July, allowed for the establishment of 
field kitchens and bakeries for the first time in Normandy. Since 
these services were all present when the 2nd and 4th Divisions 
were activated in the last half of the campaign, quite often the 3rd 
Division’s unique experience without them is obscured or ignored 
altogether by historians. However, few troops in the 3rd Division 
were ignorant of the momentous dietary change. The Can Scots’ war 
diarist wrote a lengthy remark about the arrival of “dry rations” 
(food “cooked in a rear area and ... trucked up to the front”) after 
more than fifty days of composite (or compo) rations:
It has been decided to alternate dry and compo rations from day to 
day. The cooks are given more scope in this case and can prepare more 
interesting meals. It has been noted, too, that complaints about cooking 
are quite rare now. We have all been cooking our own food up ‘till this 
time and appreciate the incumbent difficulties.66
63  WD – RR, log entry, 23 and 31 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15199, file 744, LAC; and 
Young, Red Shield in Action, 108-09.
64  WD – QOR, log entry, 16 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15169, file 753, LAC. 
65  “BEQ #122, Capt. Bryson Kearns,” RG24, vol. 10450, LAC.
66  WD – CSR, log entry 27-28 July 1944, RG24, vol. 15037, file 734(400), LAC.
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The change was a considerable departure from previous practices. In 
the weeks after D-Day, the stalemate outside Caen became a stubborn 
problem for unit messing that demanded decentralisation. Since the 
Allied lines were under constant observation and the Germans could 
shell any part of the beachhead, groups of soldiers crowding around 
field kitchens invited immediate mortar fire. Therefore, opportunities 
for feeding had to be seized upon by company or platoon commanders 
whenever they arose, meaning that for the first six weeks in Normandy, 
soldiers subsisted on tinned rations cooked in their slit trenches. To 
help attenuate the dietary monotony, the British and Canadians 
utilised compo rations which provided soldiers with fourteen meals 
of various types per box, thus allowing greater variety. Soldiers could 
mix and match tins of meat, sausage, bacon, Irish stew, steak and 
kidney pudding, sweets, margarine, vegetables, biscuits and beans to 
form their own menus at mealtimes.67 Although the compo rations 
were the primary food supply, soldiers were also issued emergency 
rations before combat operations, which could feed them for a day 
while the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps and the battalion’s 
Quartermaster brought fresh compo rations forward.68
Although welcomed by the troops, the changing dietary experience 
brought unintended consequences and suffering. The new field 
kitchens may have provided greater quality and varieties of foods, 
but they also centralised the cooking in rear areas, now safe from 
German shelling. This meant that more soldiers were eating food 
cooked with the same utensils and in the same pots and kitchens, 
rather than in isolated slit trenches. More problematically, food 
cooked in the rear had to be transported forward to the troops (who 
were already living in squalor) through the wasteland of dead bodies, 
animal carcasses and destroyed landscapes created by the grizzly 
fighting at Verrières Ridge and towards Falaise. The hot summer sun 
baked the putrefying mess and spawned swarms of flies. In fact, there 
were so many flies in Normandy, they buzzed across the battlefields 
south of Caen in black clouds, moving from decaying flesh and hastily 
67  Operational Feeding: The Use of Field Rations, 1942 (Ottawa: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1942), 1-7, 78/361, DHH; “Army Nutrition: Notes for Medical 
Officers,” n.d., 1-12, RG24, vol. 12634, file 11/Rations/9, LAC; “Food Facts to Keep 
You Fighting Fit,” n.d, 1-5, RG24, vol. 12633, file 11/Rations/4, LAC; Ellis, The 
Sharp End of War, 275-77; and George Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy: A 
Soldier’s Eye View, France 1944 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995), 46-51.
68  Warren, Wait for the Wagon, 280-85.
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constructed latrines to soldiers’ bodies and equipment and to their 
food and cooking utensils.69 The conditions were ripe for the spread 
of disease and mass food poisoning. 
It was not long before disaster struck, in the form of what Maj. 
E. L. Davey, the CO of the 7th Field Hygiene Section attached to the 
3rd Division, called “mild outbreaks of diarrhoea or gastro intestinal 
disturbances.” According to him, the cases were not severe enough 
“to warrant evacuation or cause the affected personnel to be off duty 
for more than 24 hours.”70 But later bacterial tests of stool samples 
proved that Davey’s initial assessment was partially mistaken: 20 to 
30 per cent of the samples tested positive for “Flexner A-2” and were 
therefore categorised as “mild dysentery.”71 Yet it is doubtful that 
anyone suffering from that terrible sickness would have described it as 
mild. The awful by-product of bad nutrition, squalor and contaminated 
foods, dysentery brought soldiers to their knees, convulsing with 
severe cramps and fever followed by uncontrollable and painful bowel 
movements expelling blood, mucus and fecal matter. It was a horrible 
plague that sapped energy from the soul and eventually complicated 
offensive operations. As George Blackburn later remembered:
One man’s dysentery-induced expulsion aroused my own memories of 
the convulsive cramps and feverish, shuddering ague brought on by that 
damnable scourge that struck the Canadian Army around Verrières 
before the drive down the Falaise road began, which worsened as time 
went on to the point where it came close to putting some units out of 
action when supplies of medicine to treat it ran out.72 
Records from Davey’s unit and the other Field Hygiene sections 
attached to Canadian divisions documented the deteriorating health 
and sanitary conditions at the front. Although living conditions 
remained dreadful in June and early July, the fact that Canadian 
69  WD – 13th Field Hygiene Section, Major C. L. Pearson, “Monthly Hygiene 
Report, August 1944,” 31 August 1944, 3, RG24, vol. 15937, file 202, LAC; and 
Major F. O. R. Garner, “Quarterly Report (July, August, & Sept, 44),” 10 October 
1944, 3, RG24, vol. 12593, file 11/12 FD HYG SEC/1, LAC.
70  WD – ADMS, Major E. L. Davey, “Monthly Hygiene Report, 7th Field Hygiene 
Section,” 2 August 1944, 1-2, RG24, vol. 15661, file 700, LAC.
71  WD – ADMS, Davey, “Monthly Hygiene Report,” 2 August 1944, 2, RG24, vol. 
15661, file 700, LAC.
72  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, xv.
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units occupied the same general positions north of Caen meant 
that there were opportunities for work parties to develop better 
sanitation infrastructure while the stalemate settled in. Coupled 
with the excellent physical fitness of the soldiers, gained through 
years of training prior to D-Day, this appears to have prevented any 
severe outbreaks of disease and only a modest increase in sickness 
was recorded during the first half of the campaign. In the five weeks 
before the capture of Caen, medical units in the 3rd Division treated 
452 sicknesses for more than twenty-four hours, of which only fifty-
two were diagnosed under the catch-all heading “Diseases of the 
Digestive System,” later used to describe the epidemic.73
However, everything changed in July and August. Right as the 
depleted 3rd Division was fighting down the Caen-Falaise highway, a 
total of 1,330 sicknesses were recorded, 648 of which were digestive 
diseases and almost all were bouts of food poisoning and dysentery.74 
Luckily, most cases were not considered life threatening by medical 
authorities as the symptoms lasted no longer than twenty-four hours. 
But this was just the tip of the iceberg: because the duration of 
the symptoms was an important factor in tabulating the weekly 
summaries, only those patients treated for more than a day were 
recorded, meaning that the vast bulk of cases were not counted in 
official statistics. However, the gravity of the situation compelled 
medical and hygiene officers to make special notations in their reports 
about the vile conditions prevailing everywhere. Maj. C. L. Pearson, 
CO of the 13th Field Hygiene Section attached to 2nd Division, noted 
that a “mild infectious diarrhoea that caused slight disability for 24 
hours” was prevalent throughout August and it “affected at some 
time or other about 80%” of the entire division.75 Similarly, the CO 
of the 12th Field Hygiene Section attached to 4th Division, estimated 
that “at least 90% of personnel [in the division] had diarrhoea of 
varying severity” in August.76 
73  WD – ADMS, “Weekly Summary of Sick, Injured, and Dead,” various dates, 
June-July 1944, RG24, vol. 15661, file 700, LAC.
74  WD – ADMS, “Weekly Summary of Sick, Injured, and Dead,” various dates in 
August and September 1944, RG24, vol. 15661, file 700, LAC; and Davey, “Monthly 
Hygiene Report,” 3 September 1944, 2, RG24, vol. 15661, file 700, LAC.
75  WD – 13th Field Hygiene Section, Pearson, “Monthly Hygiene Report, August 
1944,” 3, RG24, vol. 15937, file 202, LAC. 
76  Garner, “Quarterly Report,” 10 October 1944, 2-3, RG24, vol. 12593, file 11/12 
FD HYG SEC/1, LAC.
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Changing weather patterns in September and the institution of 
“vigorous fly control measures concentrated at kitchens and ration 
points, more efficient mess tin washing, greater sanitary sense on the 
part of cooks, flyproofing of latrines and refuse pits” brought an end 
to the epidemic.77 However, by then the scourge had wreaked havoc on 
the strength and effectiveness of many Canadian units. For example, 
during Operation Tractable (14-16 August 1944), the Can Scots were 
ordered to attack Point 168, just north of Falaise, but the German 
resistance there proved to be fierce and unforgiving. According to the 
war diarist, on 15 August the unit “stepped into a molten fire bath of 
battle” and suffered dearly capturing Point 168: thirty-three killed and 
119 wounded, its highest single-day casualties for the entire Normandy 
campaign.78 Yet lost in discussions of that battle is the fact that the 
Can Scots fought it without their talented and popular CO, Lt.-Col. 
F. N. Cabeldu. On 10 August, he and several others from battalion 
headquarters were “struck by the scourge of soldiers” and evacuated to 
the rear with severe cases of the stomach flu, enteritis and dysentery.79 
Thus, the Battle for Point 168 was overseen by the unit’s second-in-
command, Maj. R. M. Lendrum; an unfortunate trial by fire for the 
first-time battalion commander. Robbed of experienced leadership, a 
lesser unit might have faltered during the intense clash but the Can 
Scots had a well-earned reputation as an exceptional unit and its troops 
persevered to secure their objectives; a remarkable feat considering that 
many were likely suffering from the same afflictions as Cabeldu.
The magnitude of the accomplishments at Falaise should be 
obvious to anyone who can recall their last bout of food poisoning 
or stomach flu and the convalescences it took to recover from that 
unpleasant experience. Sapped of energy and without the benefit 
of civilian comforts, it is hard to imagine how anyone could have 
functioned in those life and death situations encountered by Canadians 
as they closed the Falaise Gap and ended the Battle of Normandy. 
Yet as George Blackburn so eloquently stated, “the war historians” 
and “armchair strategists,” writing years after the fact, showed little 
appreciation for the conditions in which soldiers fought and unfairly 
77  WD – 13th Field Hygiene Section, Pearson, “Monthly Hygiene Report, August 
1944,” 3, RG24, vol. 15937, file 202, LAC.
78  WD – CSR, log entry, 15 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15038, file 734(400), LAC; and 
Copp, Fields of Fire, 231.
79  WD – CSR, log entry, 10 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15038, file 734(400), LAC. 
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criticised the “slow” operational progress as a missed opportunity to 
destroy a larger German force. Instead, those critics “should have 
spent more time wondering how men ever summoned up the necessary 
moral courage and physical stamina to get there at all.”80 The soldiers 
who survived the hell of Normandy were more forgiving than later 
historians. As the Can Scots war diarist noted on 17 August: “We were 
delighted to learn that Lt. Col. Cabeldu had left hospital and was now 
at our A Echelon resting. He will return to [battalion headquarters] 
tomorrow. All ranks stated though, that our leader in absence of Lt. 
Col. Cabeldu, A/C.O. Major Lendrum had done a difficult job well.”81
conclusion
Throughout the end of August 1944, the whole Canadian line was 
engulfed by intense and bitter clashes against a desperate enemy in 
difficult terrain. The Can Scots’ war diarist, like his counterparts 
in other battalions, wrote several log entries that recounted the 
unrelenting and remorseless nature of the fighting. On 20 August, he 
wrote that “the strain of battle seemed to leave men both weak and 
restless. Even though 5 days have elapsed since ‘Hill 168’ everyone still 
carries many ugly memories of the hell of that day. Rest seems to be 
the best cure for battle after-effects. Nerves calm and mental wounds 
have an opportunity to heal.”82 At that point, morale in Canadian 
units was ebbing and many desperately needed time in reserve to 
recover from sustained combat operations. As this article has shown, 
the provision of rest in reserve positions was crucial to sustaining 
morale and combat operations in the 3rd Division during the Battle 
of Normandy. Those forces stationed in reserve offered battalions 
and brigades sufficient defensive depth and offensive potential, while 
the constant rotation of subunits allowed commanders to manage 
the physical and psychological strain of battle. These periodic breaks 
weaponised rest and proved useful in forestalling battle exhaustion 
and rebuilding cohesive fighting units ahead of the next engagement.
For those at the sharpest end, being stationed in reserve might have 
provided some relief but it did not entail a holiday. To be tactically and 
80  Blackburn, The Guns of Normandy, xv.
81  WD – CSR, log entry, 17 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15038, file 734(400), LAC.
82  WD – CSR, log entry, 20 August 1944, RG24, vol. 15038, file 734(400), LAC.
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operationally relevant, battalion and company reserve positions could 
never be located more than a few hundred metres away from the front, 
so short, periodic rotations into reserve were all that could be offered 
to soldiers until the capture of Caen in early July. Moreover, reserve 
units were often employed as surplus labour and tasked with improving 
infrastructure or training replacements, which greatly impacted the 
quality of rest for those recently rotated from the front. Yet, despite 
these shortcomings, the reserve position opened up a variety of non-
combat related experiences, events and activities that defined much of 
the soldiers’ daily life. In reserve, they could wash themselves and their 
clothes, sleep, write letters, loot supplies from their surroundings and 
restore the reservoirs of courage needed to continue fighting.
The significance of rest and the reserve position also evolved as 
the campaign in Normandy moved inland. Prior to the capture of 
Caen in early July, the beachhead was too narrow and congested to 
support elaborate logistical arrangements, such as field kitchens or 
entertainment venues. But after Caen’s capture, Allied forces finally 
secured enough territory to establish more sophisticated services in 
rear areas. Behind the lines and out of range of German shelling, 
a logistical and administrative transformation took place as more 
units disembarked and entered the battle. The scourge of dysentery 
and food poisoning that ravaged Canadian troops as they fought 
towards Falaise was symptomatic of this transformation and further 
demonstrates the interconnectedness between the frontline and 
reserve positions. The reserve position was thus a critical lynchpin to 
Canadian combat operations in Normandy and a central element of 
the experience of war for the common soldier. 
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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